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#7185 - Incorporation And Construction Super Summaries - Contracts 2

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Concept Key Cases Issue Principle

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Terms:

Statements made during negotiations

JJ Savage (1ia) Was the word ‘estimate’ sufficiently promissory to give rise to a collateral contract?
  • Only a promise expressed as an assurance, guarantee or promise would give rise to a collateral warranty

347/3 [442]
  • The word ‘estimate’ should be construed as an ‘approximate calculation based on probability’

  • The only conclusion on the evidence was that Blakney formed his own judgement relying on the appellant’s opinion

347/2 [442]

347/4 [443]

Skinner splits statements made in negotiations into: Puff, representation and contractual promise (the first having no, the second some and last much contractual significance)

Furthermore he says that the English approach differs to the Australian approach but may be mentioned first.

His four steps in analysing whether or not something is a contractual promise:

  • Identify the type of contract

  • Identify the terms of the contract

  • Apply the common law test

  • Analogize to cases

The textbook cites: the words used, relevant expertise of the parties, importance of the statement/temporal considerations as all being relevant.

Oscar Chess (1ib) Was a warranty intended when the seller produced a registration book to describe the make of a car?
  • If an intelligent bystander would infer a warranty was intended, that will suffice

  • This depends on the conduct of the parties, on their words and behaviour. Much depends on the precise words used

349/2 [375]

349/1

[375]

  • The proper inference from the known facts is that it was obvious to both seller and buyer that the seller had no personal knowledge of the year the car was made.

  • He only became the owner after a great number of changes and must have been relying on the registration book. It is unlikely he would warrant the year of manufacture

349/3 [376]
Dick Bentley (1ic) Was a warranty intended when a seller intimated he was ‘in a position to find out the history of cars’?
  • If a representation is made for the sole purpose of, and succeeds in, inducing a party to enter into a contract this creates a prima facie ground for inferring that a warranty is intended

  • This can be rebutted if proved it was an innocent representation

350/3 [67]
  • The inference is not rebutted in this case because the dealer “was in a position to know the history of the car”. He could get it by writing to the makers but he did not do so.

  • He ought to have known better and there was no reasonable foundation for his statement.

350/3 [67]
Concept Key Cases Issue Principle

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Terms: The effect of signature

OR Incorporation by Signature

L’estrange (1iia)

What was the effect of signing a contract, a term of which excluded all other express or implied terms?

What was the effect of signing an Application for Credit

  • When a document containing contractual terms is signed, then, in the absence of fraud (or misrep) the party signing it is bound and it is immaterial whether he has read the document or not.

351/2 [403]
  • No evidence of fraud could be found – whether or not the plaintiff knew she signed an order form is immaterial, it was an order form and order forms contain contractual terms

  • There is no evidence of misrepresentation – the document was headed ‘Sales Agreement’

  • Hence the plaintiff cannot be heard to say she is not bound by its terms.

Le Mans was a case where it was held an exclusion clause did not apply because there was no finding of a contract of hire – the document signed was not intimated to the plaintiff as a contractual document.

Further it seems to be a relevant consideration as to whether or not the document is contractual in nature.

Click-wrap contracts are binding where “appropriately reliable methods” are used to indicate approval and consent to requirements – e.g. an “I accept” button (eBay v Creative Festival Entertainment)

Toll v (1iib)
  • The rights and liabilities of the parties of parties are determined by what each party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe.

  • The effect of signatures is consistent with this settled principle – a reasonable reader would rely on a signature.

  • This does not apply in cases of misrepresentation, non est factum and where a document is a memorandum of a previous contract that didn’t include the term

353/3 [179]

180/2 [180]

357/1 [185]

  • Decisions of documents of a non-contractual nature have no bearing – here it was conceded that Applications for Credit intend to affect legal relations.

  • There was no evidence to support a finding that Applications for Credit in the transport industry do not normally contain general terms o contract

  • Whether or not the outcome in Le Mans can be supported is irrelevant because the above was conceded

358/3 [186]

358/5 [188]

[189]

Curtis (1iic) Where someone misrepresents the scope of an exclusion clause, what effect is given to it
  • Any behaviour, by words or conduct, is sufficient to be a misrepresentation if it is such as to mislead the other party about the existence or extent of the exemption

361/2 [808-9]
  • By failing to draw attention to the width of the exclusion clause, the assistant created a false impression that the exemption clause applied only to beads and sequins

  • Furthermore it may have been understood that the document was merely a voucher and not contractual in nature. But in this case the customer had actual knowledge that it was contractual.

361/3 [809]

361/4 [809]

Concept Key Cases Issue Principle

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Incorporation by Notice Sun Line (2ia) Whether an exclusion clause on a ticket obtained upon boarding, in exchange for an exchange order, was binding.
  • Conventional offer and acceptance analysis needs to be applied

  • If an exemption clause is made to a party unaware that it is to be included the other party must do “all that [is] reasonably necessary” to bring notice of the clause to the party.

363/2 [229]
  • The ticket cannot be regarded as an offer. The objective intention of the parties must have been that it was performance of a contract of carriage. The ticket was a voucher of entitlement to be carried on terms already agreed. The exchange order was an option to acquire the ticket

    • Their honours were led to this conclusion by the insufficiency of opportunity to read and elect whether to accept (incl. Travel to Greece)

  • The exchange order mentions a ‘Sun Line passage contract’ but no particulars are given as to the ‘exclusive jurisdiction clause’ are made. Since insufficient was done to bring the clause to his attention it was not incorporated into the contract of carriage and could not be incorporated by insertion into the ticket.

363/1 [228]

Is this only for contracts of carriage? Tread lightly. All so called ‘ticket cases’ should be analysed according to traditional O&A analysis subject to common sense.

Skinner’s 3 questions to answer in cases of incorporation:

  • What is the claim made (e.g. failure to return goods) and what is the cause of action (negligence, contract)

  • What is the defence (e.g. clause excluding liability – incorporated in 1 of 5 ways)

  • If the term is incorporated, does it do what the defence contends it does (Question of construction)

Thornton (2ib) Where conditions are displayed inside the premises and can only be read after receipt of the ticket can they form part of the contract?
  • A customer is bound by terms brought to his notice beforehand, but not otherwise – if the terms differ on a notice brought afterwards it is too late. The contract has already been made (Marlborough Court)

  • In cases where notice is brought before (e.g. ticket case) it comes down to if: what was done was reasonably sufficient to give notice or if the person knew or believed the document to contain conditions ( Denning Mellish J)

365/6 [169]

366/1 [170]

  • In cases of an automatic machine, the contract is concluded when the ticket is thrust. Any liability exemption arising from a clause on the ticket cannot exempt the company of liability. Here the clause gave notice to conditions on the premises invisible before entrance.

  • The former – in this case where the clause was “so wide and destructive of rights” required attention to be drawn in the most explicit way (red hand)

  • The burden was on the company to prove the latter and they had not done so

365/6 [169]

366/1 [170]

Concept Key Cases Issue Principle

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Incorporation by a Course of Dealings (ICD) Balmain (2id) Where notices displayed over wharf, could the company contractually impose 1 penny exit fee
  • Terms of a contract may be implied from the circumstances without even looking to the question of reasonable notice.

  • [implied] Actual knowledge of contractual terms can defeat a claim on its own

370/2 [390]
  • Having travelled on the company’s boats on many occasions, he must have known their method of conducting business

  • The only contract to be implied is one of carriage.

  • His rights were hence no different from someone who had got off the boat – he was on private property of his own free will and thus could only exit upon compliance with the conditions

370/2 [391]

370/3 [391]

Relevant considerations are hence:

  • Timing (Rinaldi and Hill)

  • Consistency (McCutcheon)

  • Number of occasions (SAPPA/Lillico)

  • Contractual documents (Rinaldi and Hill)

Rinaldi (2ie) Where...
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Contracts 2
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