This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Learn more

#7290 - Duress Undue Influence And Unconscionable Dealing - Contracts 2

Notice: PDF Preview
The following is a more accessible plain text extract of the PDF sample above, taken from our Contracts 2 Notes. Due to the challenges of extracting text from PDFs, it will have odd formatting.
See Original

Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing

  • The substance of such cause of actions is that the defendant enjoys an anscedant position vis-à-vis the plaintiff and abused that position by subjecting the plaintiff to threats (duress) or undue pressure (undue influence) or by taking advantage of the plaintiff’s position of special disadvantage (unconscionable dealing).

  • The courts are generally concerned with procedural unfairness (relating to how the contract was brought about) rather than substantive unfairness (in the contracts terms) but “contractual imbalance may be so extreme as to raise a presumption of procedural unfairness, such as undue influence or some other form of victimisation” (Hart v Connor)

Basic Elements of Duress

  • Duress is generally seen as a factor vitiating, not negating consent (if the latter was true the contract would be void ab initio rather than voidable)

  • The accused mustn’t be deprived of choice but rather have to choose between two evils unwillingly. Two conclusions may be drawn from this:

    • The contract is voidable and not void (except in extreme cases)

    • It is material how/why the deflection of freedom occurred – this depends on the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate pressure

Universal Tankships of Manrovia v International Transport Workers Federation [1983] 1 AC 366

Relevant Facts: The ITF (trade union) ‘blacked’ UTMs ship, ensuring that it doesn’t get serviced. In order to secure the lifting of the blacking and avoid disastrous financial consequences from being stranded in port they acceded to various demands by ITF – including the payment of $6480 to ITF’s welfare fund. They later claimed the return of the money having paid it under ‘economic duress. At the House of Lords ITF conceded it was guilty of economic duress but claimed immunity through the Trade Unions Act that provide protection in respect of ‘trade disputes. The majority said the Act didn’t provide immunity in the circumstances of the case – allowing the appeal

Ratio (Lord Scarman):

  • The two elements of duress are pressure amounting to compulsion of the victim’s will and the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted. The class case is generally not the lack of will but the lack of practical choices open.

  • The absence of choice can be proven by protest, the absence of independent advice, or a declaration of intention to go to law to recover money paid or property transferred – but none are determinative

    • In this case the trial judge’s verdict on this matter was uncontested – it was a matter of “urgent commercial necessity” that they be able to use their ships and they were advised that the chance of obtaining an injunction was slim

  • The real issue is therefore the second limb (legitimacy). Two matters may be considered

    • The nature of the pressure – this need not be unlawful, in most cases it will be lawful pressure (e.g. threat to report to the authorities for blackmail)

    • The pressure of the demand which the pressure is applied to support

      • In this case the nature of the demand determines whether the pressure threatened (blacking) was lawful or unlawful – its conceded that if it was unlawful that the owner can recover but not if it was lawful

      • The lawfulness depends on whether the act done was in contemplation of a trade dispute – if it was it wouldn’t be actionable in tort and therefore it is unlikely that, being protected by statute from suit, it could amount to distress. This would be inconsistent with legislative policy

Duress and coercion of the person

  • At common law,, wrongful coercion (duress) was narrow in scope and meant that one who used subtle/indirect methods of coercion would be exempt

  • “Where an agreement harsh and inequitable in itself has been executed under the circumstances of pressure on the part of the person who executes it, the court will set it aside” (Ormes v Beadel)

  • This meant the context of violence wasn’t necessary – e.g. threat of lawful prosecution

Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104

Relevant Facts: The plaintiff alleged that the defendant coerced him into executing a deed relating to the sale of companies by threatening to have him murdered. Street J found that the many death threats justified Barton taking them seriously but also that there were compelling business reasons for executing the deeds and thus the threats didn’t coerce him. The Court of Appeal adopted this chiefly but held the plaintiff couldn’t succeed unless he established that but for the threats he wouldn’t have executed the deed and he failed to do so. Barton appealed to the Privy Council.

Ratio (Majority, Lord Cross of Chelsea):

  • Saw an analogy between duress and undue influence and setting aside contracts for fraud where the court doesn’t allow examination of the relative importance of contributory clauses

  • Thought that the onus was on Armstrong to establish that “the threats which he was making and the unlawful pressure which he was exerting for the purpose of inducing Barton to sign the agreement and which Barton knew were being made and exerted for the purpose in fact contributed nothing to Barton’s decision to sign”

    • The trial judge found there was threats to kill, Barton’s situation was one of ‘very real mental torment’ and there was a belief it would end if the documents executed

    • Though Barton would have executed the documents if the threats weren’t made, the threats did contribute to his decision to sign and to recommend their execution by other parties

      • Hence the appeal should be allowed and the deceleration made that the deeds were executed under duress and void so far as concerns him

Ratio (Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon of Glaisdale):

  • Of the various means that consent can be obtained – advice/persuasion/influence/inducement/representation/commercial pressure – the law has come to select some that it will not accept as voluntary action (duress/undue influence/coercion)

  • Thought that the relevant test were:

    • The plaintiff must show that illegitimate means of persuasion were used

      • Threats to Barton’s life were found and accepted

    • The next step is establish the relationship between illegitimate means used and the action taken (same test that the majority preferred)

  • On points of onus see Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1988) 19 NSWLR 40

    • “It is sufficient that the illegitimate pressure was one of the reasons for the person entering into the agreement. Once the evidence establishes that the pressure exerted on the victim was illegitimate, the onus lies on the person applying the pressure to show that it made no contribution to the victim entering into the agreement”

Duress and undue influence

  • Undue influence covers the situation where a party, by virtue of reliance on and confidence in the defendant, suffers from impaired judgement as to his/her own best interests

Relationships of influence

  • Since actual undue influence If the plaintiff can prove a relationship of influence existed between the parties characterised by ascendancy of one party over the other

    • In such a case the courts recognize a presumption of undue influence exercised by the defendant and the defendant must rebut this presumption by proving that the contract/gift was not the result of abuse of influence but was rather entered into as a result of full free and informed thought

  • Equity deems certain relationships to be of influence (parent/child, guardian/ward, religious adviser/disciple, solicitor/client, doctor/patient but not financial adviser/client and not always fiduciary relationships or husbands/wives but they may be established)

  • If no such relationship can be established then they must prove actual undue influence (Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145)

Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113

Relevant Facts: The plaintiff was an ‘administrator cum testament annexo’ of the will of his deceased father (Buttress) against the defendant. The plaintiff sought to set aside a document by which land was transferred to the defendant. Buttress was an illiterate person and unstable in his relationships, being in possession of very few assets. After the death of his wife he moved from place to place and administered and amended wills for his property in favour of various people (Mrs Job, Mrs Hart etc.). He visited the defendant a number of times and depended on them for general help. He wished to transfer his property o her – the clerk gave evidence that he heard the defendant say explicitly that he wished to have the property transferred as a gift and understood that he was giving it not selling it. The consideration given was hence ‘natural love and affection.

Buttress lived first in a tent and later a shack made by him on land owned by he defendant who provided him with clothes and necessaries from time to time. They visited each other regularly. Eventually he became ill and on his way to the hospital he gave another will which he had made to Mrs Hart under which she was the sole beneficiary. The transfer to the defendant and the will was not made known to Buttress’s relatives and evidence was given that he forbade disclosure.

The trial judge found that Buttress was a man of less than average intelligence, had little capacity for understanding business and when executing the transfer did not understand that he parted with it irrevocably and hence the transfer must be set aside.

Principles and Policy (Dixon J):

  • Established the rules with respect to presumptions (as above) – when a presumption stands the person against which it lies must satisfy the court that he...

Unlock the full document,
purchase it now!
Contracts 2
Target a first in law with Oxbridge