Casebook Component – Estoppel and Waiver
Estoppel
The restriction of a right to terminate may also be by way of a equitable estoppel – where an aggrieved party is estopped from terminating the contract having induced the other party to believe that the contract will not be terminated in the circumstances, and the other party relies on that assumption to his/her detriment.
Waiver
Sargent v ASL Developments Ltd (1974) 13 CLR 634 Mason J:
|
---|
Relief Against Forfeiture (RAF) – Casebok component
Termination can result in another party suffering the deprivation (or forfeiture) of proprietary interest
In equity a court may in its discretion provide relief against such forfeiture by ordering specific performance in favour of the party in breach (as below)
Legione v Hateley (1982) 152 CLR 406 - Estoppel Relevant Facts: Under a contract of sale dated 14/7/78 the Hateley’s (H – the purchasers) agreed to purchase land from the Legione’s (L – the vendors). The purchase price was $35k, $6k deposit and the balance with an interest rate of 8% on 1/7/79. On payment of the deposit, the H’s entered into possession. Without knowledge of the L’s they built a house on it. SC 5 stated that time was of the essence and provided that parties couldn’t enforce rights/remedies under the contract unless written notice was given specifying the default and the intention to enforce the rights/remedies unless the default is made good within a period of not less than 14 days of notice and the party failed to remedy that default. It also provided that (if stated in the notice) the contract would be rescinded if the default was not remedies at the expiration of the period. The purchasers expected to raise the balance on the sale of another property but that sale fell through. On 29/6, H informed L and requested a three-month extension. On 12/7 L’s solicitors declined. On 26/7 a notice was sent stating that if the balance and interest were not paid L’s would rescind. The time for payment expired on 10//8. On 9/8 H’s solicitor phoned L’s solicitor and told the secretary that they had arranged bank finance and would be ready to settle on 17/8. The secretary intimated “I think that’ll be all right but I’ll have to get instructions”. On 14/8 L claimed the contract had been rescinded in consequence of the notice and refused a tender of the purchase price. Case History: The H’s unsuccessfully sought an order for specific performance in the VSC, the vendor’s counterclaim for a declaration of rescission was successfull. H appealed to the FCA and L’s appealed to the HCA. Issue: Would the vendors be estopped from denying the assumption fostered by Ms Williams Gibbs CJ and Murphy J:
Mason and Deane JJ were of the contrary view. While they accepted that the solicitor’s acted on the representation (though hesitantly) they found issue with the fact that the conduct must be “a clear representation”. They thought the fact that Gardiner intimated the bank would be “ready to settle” (not will settle), and that William’s statement was in reply meant that there was no representation of a time extension. They thought the fact that she was to get instructions was intimation that she was not in a position to agree on what was being put to her. This, for them, was insufficient to found a promissory estoppel. |
---|
Textbook Component – Relief Against Forfeiture
Termination brings to an end the right to expect further performance but it also may effect a forfeiture of an interest in property/a proprietary right.
In appropriate cases the court may grant relief against forfeiture of the interest in property and decree specific performance of the contract
Property interest required
While traditionally RAF was only available to protect interest in property (e.g. lessor determines a lease for default by the lessee in paying rent), in Australia the HCA has been prepared to grant relief against the loss of a purchaser’s interest in land under a contract for the sale of land notwithstanding a breach of a time condition entitling the vendor to terminate
Though RAF may apply to protect interests in personal property, in England it has been held that it does not protect purely contractual rights – there is support for this view in Australia [FAC v Makucha Developments Pty Ltd (1993)]
The unconscientious exercise of legal rights or ‘unconscientious conduct’
The court must grapple with depriving an aggrieved party of the right to terminate as well as its confidence that it can achieve the principal objects of the transaction – thus it does not extend to situations where the applicant is not in a position to complete their side of the bargain (Kastopoulos v GE Commercial Finance Australia Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 311
In Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC Lord Wilberforce intimated that something such as “fraud, accident, mistake or surprise” was required to warrant RAF. While a broader view was adopted in Legione and Stern v McArthur in Tanwar Enterprises Pty Limited v Cauchi [2003] HCA, the court expressed a preference for Wilberforce’s view (noting that equity doesn’t intervene to reshape contractual relations in a form the court thinks to be more reasonable or fair.
Susequent cases (Romanos v Pentagold Investments Pty Ltd [2003] HCA follow this stricter approach
Legione
The majority in this case noted that the purchaser’s breach was “inadvertent and not wilful” but didn’t consider estoppel
Mason and Deane JJ considered that the intimation of the vendor’s solicitors contributed to the breach by creating the impression they would accept completion of the contract in a few days – but thought the representation was insufficiently clear to found an estoppel.
But at the same time they said this conduct could support RAF – hence there may be a difference between the unconscientious conduct that underlie these two doctrines.
The majority also considered that RAF was potentially influenced by the fact that the purchaser’s house would accrue as a windfall to the vendors if the contract was terminated
Stern
Involved a case where the sale of land where the price was to be provided for by instalments. The purchasers fell behind and the vendors terminated. While the vendors were prepared to allow the purchasers any benefit of improvements they made, they claimed the increase in the value of land.
Deane and Dawson JJ held there was no distinction in principle between contracts of sale of land by instalments and vendor’s providing finance to the purchaser on security of mortgages (Brennan J did not accept this). The latter was something that equity was traditionally prepared to grant RAF without regards to stipulations as to time.
Deane, Dawson JJ and Gaudron J also indicated concern to avoid the vendors gaining a windfall because the purchasers had a reasonable expectation of benefiting from any increases in the value of land over time.
Their approach was based on unconscionable action and unjust enrichment
Tanwar
Involved a case where the parties entered into a contract for sale of land, the deposit being already paid. The purchaser experienced difficulties in meeting the completion date specified. A new day was agreed upon (25/6) but the funds (from Singapore) did not arrive till 26/6. The HCA unanimously rejected the claim of Tanwar to RAF.
In doing so they affirmed the narrow approach of Lord Wilberforce in Shiloh and supported the cautious approach of Mason CJ in Stern. While they did not limit RAF to cases of “fraud, accident, mistake or surprise” – they said it was “necessary to point to the conduct of the vendor as having in some significant respect caused or contributed to the breach of the essential time stipulation.”
Furthermore they distinguished Legione because there the purchasers were in possession and any improvements they made were at risk of the operation of the contractual provisions for termination. Furthermore there was the fact that in Tanwar’s case no conduct “helped to lull the purchasers into the belief that they would accept completion provided it occurred in a few days”
Tanwar’s attempt to...