[8.05] Protecting the few from the company
Redmond notes the many potential areas of disagreement between members (remuneration of directors, constitutional structure etc.) and the scope of the exploitation of minority interests that can result – especially in small proprietary companies and companies whose shares are illiquid where there are no opportunities for market exit
Minority shareholders can also exploited by means such as:
Withholding dividends with profits distributed to the majority as salaries, bonuses etc.
Exclusion from management participation
Diversion of corporate assets to interests associated with the majority
Disproportionate allotments
Withholding information concerning company affairs or the making of fundamental changes that effect their interests etc.
There are a number of constraints, such as equitable constraints, on the voting power of the majority in general meeting. Two fundamental principles contend with each other in this area
The identification of the corporate will with a decision of the majority
Doctrines which together prevent majorities in GM from acting oppressively towards minorities or using powers for an improper purpose even though they act within the scope of their powers
The difficulty, however, lies in formulating a general standard for identifying the factors or conceptions that prompt judges to invoke the formulary – it requires the drawing of a distinction between a legitimate exercise of majority power, even though it can cause dissension and disappointment amongst the minority, and the use of powers that is over-reaching and unfair.
Differing conceptions of justice and fairness, the claims of the majoritarian principles and the diversity and complexity of competing interests are reflected by the clear and unambiguous standards
[8.10] Shareholder litigation
Giving shareholders legal standing is another way to protect their interest. Such standing exists in terms of a personal right to bring a cause of action, and a corporate right
The latter presents difficulties since it displaces the rule that gives directors the powers to litigate for the company. However a potential reason for running contrary to this is where the alleged wrongdoers are the directors/senior managers. If such a safeguard were not present their duties would be merely aspirational. There are others (fraud on the minority)
[8.15] The general principle
The second of the two competing principles above was traditionally expressed in Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa - “The power of the three fourths majority to alter the company articles must like all other powers, be exercised subject to those general principles of law and equity which are applicable to all powers conferred on majorities and enabling them to bind minorities. It must be exercised not only in the manner required by law, but also bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole, and it must not be exceeded”
This was not the same as the director’s duty to act in good faith since it does not carry a fiduciary obligation
But in Gambotto v WCP the HCA rejected this test as inappropriate and adopted the language of ‘oppression and improper purpose’ to define the vitiating overreach by majorities.
GM resolutions that offend this general principles are often called a fraud on the minority
Redmond notes that the cases which follows are attempted to be put into categories but notes that it is difficult to be confident that these categories identify the principles that prompt courts to invoke the doctrine or provide a reliable predictor of future judicial decision
Thus in Crumpton v Morrine Hall Jacobs J commented that “no amount of legal analysis or analytical reasoning can conceal the fact that the decision in the past turned, and must turn ultimately, on a value judgment formed in respect of the conduct of the majority – a judgment formed not by any strict process of reasoning or bare principle of law but upon the view taken of the conduct”
[8.45] Alterations of the company’s constitution that prejudice shareholder rights
A company’s constitution can be altered by special resolution – but this is subject to any requirements already placed in the company’s constitution
One challenge under the ‘fraud upon the minority’ doctrine concerns resolutions for the alteration of company constitutions that prejudicially affect the rights of some members
The classic statement in Allen v Gold Reefs that powers of majorities must be exercised in ‘bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole’ was made in the context of reviewing an alteration of company articles
But the difficulty under this and other formulations of the fraud doctrine is distinguishing between alterations that are proper, even if they prejudice/extinguish shareholder rights and those that offend the equitable limitation
The worst of such alteration is introducing machinery to appropriate the minority’s shareholdings
[8.55] Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286 Facts: The company’s constitution (CC) contained a provision prohibiting the sale of shares to non-members as long as any member was willing to purchase them at a fair price. Despite a detailed pre-emption mechanism, Mallard, wishing to sell his controlling interest to an outsider, procured an SR to alter the pre-emptive rights article by adding a proviso by that a member with an ordinary resolution can affect a transfer to an outsider. This was followed by an ordinary resolution sanctioning the transfer of shares. G challenged these as a fraud on the minority Evershed MR: The first line of attack was that this SR’s validity depended on it being passed in good faith and for the benefit of the company as a whole
The second line of attack was that the plaintiff and majority shareholders were deprived of the right of buying the shares of the majority when they were to be disposed
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Australian Fixed Trusts Pty Ltd v Clyde Industries Ltd (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 33 Facts: The directors of the defendant company gave notice of an EGM to consider an alteration to the company’s articles by disenfranchising any member holding shares as a trustee under a publicly held unit trust (‘custodian trustee’). Under the SR they couldn’t vote unless and until they had received the direction of a majority of unit holdings as to the manner of casting the vote. The plaintiffs sued to restrain this alteration. McLelland J began b drawing the inference from the evidence that custodian trustees, in most cases, would not be able to obtain a majority direction and the cost to them would be substantial – essentially taking their right to vote or greatly reducing it in its effectiveness. In doing so the right to vote of other shareholders has been rendered more effective and valuable.
The act discriminated between the minority and the majority – giving the latter an advantage which the... |
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