Some introductory remarks are made about how possession is central to the idea of property and how even though the backbone of the law has been unchanged it has been incrementally developed by common law and in the UK been subject to sweeping legislative changes.
Holmes, in The Common Law (1881) speaks of the concept of possession using two examples:
A bankrupt person does not lose possession of goods coming to him – this would be an invitation to all the world to scramble for possession of them (Webb v Fox); a rule which was justified on policy and convenience
The idea of someone hooking a fish or a whale which has developed through custom rather than any cogent and linear concept of property law
He concludes saying that the law is a practical thing that should give effect to the primal instinct of one who attempts to take back what was dispossessed from him
There exists a distinction between real property and personal property
Leases are considered as real property
Personal Property that are either
Choses in Possession (capable of being held in physical possession – jewellery etc.)
Choses in Action (intangible property like debt, shares etc.)
Three actions lie against one for wrongful interference with possession:
Trespass – interference with actual possession
Conversion – A suit lies where a positive wrongful act of dealing with goods in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the owner, who has rightful possession and not necessarily absolute ownership, is made
Detinue – A suit lies where a plaintiff in actual possession or an immediate right to it where a defendant wrongly retains the goods following a lawful demand for them
Compensation for both can be return of the goods or the market value of the goods. Return may be ordered if the goods have some special value to the plaintiff; this can be adjusted for improvements (McKeown v Cavalier Yachts (1988))
The requirements of detinue and conversion are:
Actual or immediate right to posession at the date of interference/demand
A future right is insufficient – if ownership is transferred the agreement decides this
In the case of bailed goods the bailor may recall the goods at any time; meaning if a third party interferes both bailor and bailee has action against them
Jeffries v The Great Western Railway Co (1856) 119 ER 680 Facts: P (GWRC) brings an action of trover (conversion) against D (J). P proves the defendant seized trucks from their possession; claiming they were assigned to P by O. D claims that O has been declared a bankrupt and thus ownership was not to P but to those given title to the goods by the Court of Bankruptcy. Ratio (Lord Campbell CJ):
Wightman J delivers to much the same respect This case is also authority for the proposition that despite the chance of steps taken by the rightful owner; the wrongdoer must pay the full market value of the chattel taken and is still vulnerable to action from the rightful owner. |
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A contractual right to possession without actual possession isn’t sufficient for detinue (Jarvis v Williams) – interesting example of one who buys goods from one not the owner but does not enter possession; his claim may be defeated by the wrongdoer asserting ownership of B. Jus tertii is used to deny the cause of action
In Costello v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary, Lightman J ruled that possession, even if by theft (in which case the title is frail), vests possessory title which is good against all but one who can claim better title.
Battersby (Acquiring Title by Theft) comments on the idea of relative title – however acquired title prevails against all who subsequently possess without better title.
The same point is made in R v McKiernan [2003] in a case regarding a church bell
The Winkfield (1902) All ER Rep 346 Facts: The case concerns a claim of the Postmaster-General in the case of The Winkfield. Having crashed with the Mexican the owners of the Winkfield paid the amount they were liable for to the court. The PMG claimed to recover from the sum given the value of letters, parcels etc. In his custody as a bailee and lost on board the mexican Ratio (Collins MR):
His honour then reviewed the authorities to overturn Cladridge’s Case Cited authorities, including lectures on the Common Law by Holmes J, the old yearbook case of Heydon and Smith to conclude that in many cases a bailee could recover against a wrongdoer despite having a complete action to bailees. The authorities were held to suggest that possession is title and the chattel damaged is that of the possessor and no other. But in repaying the bailee, the wrongdoer has a complete answer to any action by the bailor – but this ONLY applies to bailees and none-else (as noted above). |
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The rule that a bailee can recover against a wrongdoer absent by a claim by a bailee is an exception to the general rule that damages are rewarded on a compensatory basis
In general if jus tertii arises in a claim by the bailor against the bailee; the bailor is estopped from disputing the title of the bailee unless they can show a higher title (Biddle v Bond)
Even if one is in breach of terms of bailment, this does not deny their entitlement to sue a third party to the bailment (Young CJ in The Anderson Group Pty Ltd v Tynan Motors [2006])
Sometimes a bailee’s possession may be protected against a bailor (e.g. where a payment has already been tendered for the bailment; a truck in the case of City Motors v Southern Aerial Super Service)
Actual possession is sufficient for damages to be equal to the market value of the goods but if some legal arrangement exists to limit the right of the possessor; damages will be compensatory and the plaintiff can only recover the true loss sustained (City Motors)
Note the complex case on 121 where A allows B the use of a car when on holidays, C wrecks the car; A sues for damages B for nervous shock. If A settles; B has no claim arising from the bailment and must look to A for any interest he had in the car.
Wilson v Lombank (1963) 1 WLR 1294 Facts: The plaintiff (W) claimed damages for a trespass by the defendants (L) to a motor car. W bought the motor car from someone who had no title to sell; it was sent for repairs to G for which the plaintiff dealt with for a while on credit terms. Upon repair L’s agent R came to the garage and took the car away from F, an agent of H. Neither W nor L had title; another M did. Upon realizing this L delivered the car to M. Plaintiff submits: W had possession; there was no right to take it away. L cannot assert jus tertii. Defendant submits: Trespass would lie if there was possession; but there was not because the motor car was in the H’s hand.... |
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